maandag 17 mei 2010

something else

Today, the populist Right acts, sets the pace, determines the problematic of the political struggle, and the liberal centre is reduced to a 'reactive force': it ultimately limits itself to reacting to the populist Right's initiatives, either opposing them radically from an impotent Leftist posturing, or translating them into the acceptable liberal language ('while rejecting the populist hatred of the immigrants, we have to admit they are addressing issues which really worry people, so we should take care of the problem, introduce tougher immigration and anti-crime measures .. .').
The notion of the radical political Act as the way out of this democratic deadlock, of course, cannot but provoke the expected reaction from the liberals. The standard critique concerns the Act's allegedly 'absolute' character of a radical break, which renders impossible any clear distinction between a properly 'ethical' act and, say, a Nazi monstrosity: is it not that an Act is always embedded in a specific socio-symbolic context? The answer to this reproach is clear: of course ~ an Act is always a specific intervention within a socio-symbolic context; the same gesture can be an Act or a ridiculous empty posture, depending on this context (say, making a public ethical statement when it is too late changes a courageous intervention into an irrelevant gesture). In what, then, resides the misunderstanding? Why this critique? There is something else which disturbs the critics of the Lacanian notion of Act: true, an Act is always situated in a concrete context ~ this, however, does not mean that it is fully determined by its context. An Act always involves a radical risk) what Derrida, following Kierkegaard, called the madness of a decision: it is a step into the open, with no guarantee about the final outcome ~ why? Because an Act retroactively changes the very co-ordinates into which it intervenes. This lack of guarantee is what the critics cannot tolerate: they want an Act without risk ~ not without empirical risks, but without the much more radical 'transcendental risk' that the Act will not only simply fail, but radically misfire. In short, to paraphrase Robespierre, those who oppose the 'absolute Act' effectively oppose the Act as such, they want an Act without the Act. What they want is homologous to the 'democratic' opportunists who, as Lenin put it in the autumn of 1917, want a 'democratically legitimized' revolution, as if one should first organize a referendum, and only then, after obtaining a clear majority, seize power ... It is here that one can see how an Act proper cannot be contained within the limits of democracy (conceived as a positive system of legitimizing power through free elections). The Act occurs in an emergency when one has to take the risk and act without any legitimization, engaging oneself into a kind of Pascalean wager that the Act itself will create the conditions of its retroactive 'democratic' legitimization.

Slavoj Žižek - Welcome to the Desert of the Real! - p 152-153

3 opmerkingen:

babs zei

Ik heb t niet gelezen. Moet ik het lezen? Twijfel. Als ik het lees dan is er met het lezen van het boek zelf minder pret aan. Hm.

sodade zei

babs,
Je hebt toch al zeker lang begrepen dat wat op to blog staat doorgaans niet dient om gelezen te worden. Fijn dat je mijn opzet in deze dus ook volgt :)

Babs zei

Heel graag gedaan :)